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Abstract: The article considers whether the Paris Climate Change Agreement strengthens the support 
provided by the international climate change regime for renewables, a key option for decarbonising 
energy supplies.  It does this by comparing the position under the Agreement with that under the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol in four areas in which international law 
can contribute most effectively to overcoming barriers to the global growth of renewable energy 
production and consumption.  It finds that the Agreement does not improve significantly on the 
support provided by its predecessors for renewable energy.  However, it does create a serviceable 
structure for ongoing negotiations that may lead in the future to a strengthening of support for 
renewables by parties as part of their strategies for cutting carbon emissions.  It is also clear from 
several initiatives for promoting renewable energy launched at the Paris Conference of Parties that it 
is recognised internationally as being central to achievement of the Agreement’s goals.     
 
1. Introduction 
The various sectors involved with energy creation and consumption (e.g. the power industry, 
industrial, domestic) are collectively responsible for two thirds of the world’s greenhouse gas 
emissions.1  The decarbonisation of energy supplies over a short timescale is therefore central to 
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climate change mitigation.  The last two decades have seen significant growth in the production of 
low carbon energy from non-carbon emitting and carbon neutral renewable sources, but any comfort 
to be drawn from this information is quickly vanquished by statistics showing the continued 
dominance of fossil fuels.  Oil, natural gas and coal still account for around 80% of the world’s energy 
supplies.2  Indeed, their usage has doubled since the 1970s in line with the doubling of the global total 
primary energy supply over the last forty years.3  Renewable sources remain a marginal contributor 
by comparison, meeting 19% of global energy consumption in 2014 with two thirds of that being made 
up by hydroelectric power and traditional uses of biomass.4  Only 6% of energy consumption was 
derived from newer technologies for exploiting renewable sources such as wind and solar.5 
It is evident from these statistics that the international climate change regime has failed in the first 24 
years of its existence to secure a shift away from high carbon emitting sources and towards lower 
carbon alternatives in the composition of its parties’ energy mixes.  The question I consider in this 
paper is whether the new climate change agreement, adopted at the 21st Conference of Parties to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in December 2015, is better equipped to drive a worldwide 
displacement of fossil fuels by energy from renewable sources.6  I seek to answer it by comparing the 
performance of the Paris Agreement with the Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereafter 
‘the Convention’)7 and Kyoto Protocol8 in four areas in which the international law on climate change 
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8 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 10 December 
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can contribute most effectively to the global expansion of renewable energy production and 
consumption.  These are as follows: obliging the promotion of renewable energy by contracting 
parties; diverting investment and state support away from high carbon energy development including 
by sending a message that the fossil fuel era is drawing to a close; levelling the playing field between 
renewable and fossil fuel energy by placing a price on carbon emissions; and enhancing or creating 
capacity for low carbon development in the developing world through the provision of financial, 
technological and capacity building support.  The Agreement quickly reached its threshold for entry 
into force of ratification by 55 parties to the Convention and by states collectively responsible for 55% 
of estimated global greenhouse gas emissions on 5 October 2016, and entered into force formally on 
4 November 2016.    
My analysis of the Agreement reveals that its substantive provisions do not improve significantly on 
the support provided by its predecessors for renewable energy.   It does not promote alternative 
energy forms directly or place more onerous binding obligations than the Convention and the Protocol 
on its contracting parties to combat climate change and support mitigation efforts.  It does differ 
significantly from its predecessors in its expectation, expressed in several non-binding normative 
statements, that parties ought to progressively reduce their greenhouse gas emissions collectively 
(and by implication displace unabated fossil fuel generation with renewable energy and other low 
carbon alternatives) in line with the goal of achieving a balance between emissions and removals by 
sinks in the second half of the century.  However, the strength of the message that it sends to 
producers and consumers of carbon-emitting energy is weakened both by the significant leeway given 
for parties to determine what, if anything, they will contribute to the global mitigation effort, and by 
the Agreement’s dependence, given the preponderance of non-binding provisions on mitigation and 
the lack of an enforcement mechanism, on the political will of contracting parties, and, where this is 
not present, on peer pressure from other states or the influence of consumers and civil society if it is 
to attain its goals. 
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As a result, the Agreement itself is unlikely to prompt a switch to renewable energy in the short term.  
It is only through a consistent pattern of behaviour by its parties, evidencing that statements in their 
nationally determined contributions (hereafter NDCs) were not made idly, that energy investors, 
producers and consumers will be persuaded to alter their allegiance from fossil fuels to low carbon 
alternatives.  In this regard, the Agreement’s main achievement lies not in its substantive provisions, 
but in its replacement of the broken Kyoto model with a repeatable structure for on-going 
negotiations that will hopefully bear more potent fruit over time under the stimulus of growing 
evidence of a changing climate.  The difference that this new approach may make is compromised 
however by a failure to address fundamental problems with the provision of climate finance and 
technology transfer under the Convention and the Protocol that developing states have used over the 
last decade as justification for refusing to strengthen their contribution to the global mitigation effort. 
By failing to lance the boil of developed to developing world transfers, the international community 
has stored up obstacles to the progress in future negotiations that must be made if the Agreement is 
to spur improvement both in international efforts to combat climate change and to pursue renewable 
energy development as part of this.  It has also missed an opportunity to enhance the support provided 
for low carbon energy in developing states by removing obstacles to the effective functioning of 
arrangements for climate finance and technology transfer under the international climate change 
regime.      
1.1. Structure 
Section 2 of the article considers obstacles to the worldwide spread of energy from renewable sources, 
and identifies four main areas in which international law could contribute to overcoming them.  
Sections 3 to 6 then go on to examine whether the Agreement strengthens the international climate 
change regime in each of those areas by comparing provision made for them under the new 
instrument with the position under the Convention and the Protocol.  Section 7 restates the main 
conclusions drawn from the comparative analysis, and notes some initiatives announced at COP 21 
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which, irrespective of the lack of express support for renewables under the Agreement, suggest that 
its parties regard renewable energy development as the principal means by which the Agreement’s 
goals for mitigating climate change can be advanced.    
2. Displacing Fossil Fuels with Renewable Energy: Challenges and Responses 
Renewable energy can struggle to gain a foothold in energy markets and supplies despite its 
environmental advantages over fossil fuels.  Factors preventing its diffusion vary depending on the 
circumstances of different states, but some commonly occurring obstacles can be identified which 
must be overcome in order to accelerate the switch from high carbon energy sources to lower carbon 
alternatives.  This section identifies the most prominent constraints to the global growth of a 
renewables sector in connection with decarbonisation, and considers how legal action at the 
international level could assist with their alleviation.  The barriers examined are grouped under four 
categories capturing types of restriction that retard low carbon energy development: investor 
reluctance to finance relevant projects because they perceive renewable energy projects and 
technologies as being risky; the entrenchment of fossil fuel energy in the socio-economic systems of 
developed and some developing states; the non-integration of the environmental costs of greenhouse 
gas emissions in energy prices; and a lack of financial, technological, and institutional capacity for 
supporting low carbon energy in developing states.  
2.1. Creating Investor Confidence in Renewable Energy 
Renewable energy generating plant has quickly become the most attractive option for investment in 
the electricity sector, attracting more than half of the monies invested globally in electricity 
production in 2015.9  This is partly due to financial support by states, but is increasingly the result of 
rapidly decreasing costs of producing electricity from renewable sources, particularly onshore wind 
                                                          
9 Vaughan, A., ‘Renewables made up half of net electricity capacity added last year’, The Guardian, 25 October 
2016, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/oct/25/renewables-made-up-half-of-
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and solar energy, with projects using these technologies often being cost competitive with all forms 
of fossil fuel generation.10  However, investment in generation from coal and gas still continues due 
to on-going state support and to wide disparities within regions and even within states in the cost 
competitiveness of energy sources with fossil fuels sometimes remaining by far the cheaper energy 
source.11  The appeal of renewable energy is also dampened by two respects in which it compares 
unfavourably with coal and gas power plants.  The first is that it can be difficult to integrate distributed 
renewable electricity into networks designed for centralised generation because systems were 
designed only to convey electricity directly from centralised power plants to consumers and as the 
best renewable resources are often in remote areas far distant from grids serving communities.12  The 
expense of connecting generating plant to networks can add substantially to a project’s cost profile, 
and particularly if developers are expected to bear ‘deep’ connection charges covering the cost of 
associated network modifications.13  Secondly, initial development costs for fossil fuels are usually 
recovered more quickly than those for renewable energy for which project costs are largely fixed and 
incurred at the outset.14      
In addition, it is important to remember that renewable energy is a heterogeneous category made up 
of multiple technologies for extracting energy from different sources, and of different technologies 
for each source (e.g. the constant drive to develop new turbines capable of extracting more power 
from the wind than current models).  Only the better established technologies have become cost 
competitive whilst newer technologies such as wave, tidal, offshore wind and concentrated solar 
                                                          
10 International Renewable Energy Agency, ‘Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2014’, January 2015, 
available at <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/oct/25/renewables-made-up-half-of-net-
electricity-capacity-added-last-year> accessed 26 October 2016. 
11 Ibid., Bloomberg New Energy Finance, ‘Wind and Solar boost cost-competitiveness versus fossil fuels’, 5 
October 2015, available at <https://about.bnef.com/press-releases/wind-solar-boost-cost-competitiveness-
versus-fossil-fuels/> accessed 26 October 2016.  
12 Madrigal, M. and Stoft, S., Transmission Expansion for Renewable Energy Scale-Up: Emerging Lessons and 
Recommendations (The World Bank, 2012), 3-13. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Renewable Energy and Climate Change’, 194, available at 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/report/srren/> accessed 27 October 2016. 
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power remain more expensive both than fossil fuels and renewable sources of longer standing.15  All 
such technologies are likely to be needed to replace the four/fifths share of global energy consumption 
for fossil fuels, to prevent a future return to high carbon energy under the duress of growing energy 
demands from an increasing global population, and to enable an increase in electricity supplies from 
their current level in connection with decarbonising transport, industry and heating.  The failure of 
some supported technologies is a preferable risk to that of runaway climate change which every unit 
of additional fossil fuel consumption heightens.          
Electricity is the low hanging fruit of decarbonising energy supplies.  Reducing emissions from 
transport, industry and heating is more challenging due to there being fewer and less well established 
low carbon alternatives, and limited progress has been made with moving away from high carbon 
energy in these sectors.16  For road transport, responsible for over two thirds of greenhouse gas 
emissions from transport,17 this is due to a combination of: the much lower price of fuels that have 
benefitted from 100+ years of experience with their production and distribution compared to newer 
alternatives such as advanced biofuels that are still being readied for commercial application or that 
have not yet achieved economies of scale in production; the lower price of vehicles consuming petrol 
and diesel than those using alternatives, again due to the long experience with their use and resulting 
learning efficiencies and economies of scale; the lack of infrastructure for refuelling alternative fuel 
vehicles; and, for all of these reasons, the lack of popular demand for alternatives that would be 
required to prompt change in manufacturing sectors.18  The much lower cost and easy availability of 
fossil fuels and related technologies are also the key obstacles to decarbonising marine and air 
transport.19 The lack of progress with decarbonising heating and industry is partly due to cost, but also 
                                                          
15 International Renewable Energy Agency, ‘Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2014’ (n 10). 
16 International Renewable Energy Agency, ‘Roadmap for a Renewable Future 2016 Edition’, 106-120, available 
at <http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_REmap_2016_edition_report.pdf> 
accessed 26 October 2016. 
17 International Energy Agency, ‘Key CO2 Emissions Trends’, 2016, available at 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/co2-emissions-from-fuel-combustion---2016-
edition---excerpt---key-trends.html> accessed 26 October 2016. 
18 International Renewable Energy Agency, ‘Roadmap’ (n 16), 106-111. 
19 Ibid. 
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to a lack of awareness of the alternative options.20  The weakness of state support for renewable 
energy compared to the strength of backing for renewable electricity contributes to the slow rate of 
decarbonisation in all of the above sectors.21     
The most direct way in which an interstate agreement on climate change could assist with securing 
the further growth of renewable electricity and jumpstarting the spread of renewables in other areas 
is by requiring its contracting parties to increase their consumption of renewable energy as part of 
their strategies for progressive greenhouse gas reduction.  Obligations to provide active support would 
require states to adopt measures that will attract investment in renewable energy despite the 
obstacles to its growth outlined above.  Commentators on renewable energy and international law 
call for the inclusion of targets for the proportion of renewables in energy supplies and other 
deliberately supportive measures (e.g. obligations to adopt favourable policies), whether in a climate 
change agreement or a separate protocol to the Convention, as the best means by which international 
law can stimulate the global growth of a renewables sector.22  However, this may be difficult due to 
the reluctance of states in practice to compromise their sovereignty over the content of energy 
supplies by taking on obligations that expose their decision-making on energy policy to external 
scrutiny and interference.  This is borne out by the dearth of legally binding provisions requiring that 
renewable or other low carbon energy forms should be supported in international legal instruments.23 
2.2. Disestablishing Fossil Fuel Energy 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 112-120. 
21 Ibid., 106-120. 
22 Bruce, S., ‘International Law and Renewable Energy: Facilitating Sustainable Energy For All?’, (2013) 14 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 1, 30-5; Bradbrook, A. J., ‘The Development of Renewable Energy 
Technologies and Energy Efficiency Measures Through Public International Law’ in Zillman, D., Redgwell, C., 
Omorogbe, Y., and Barrera-Hernandez, L., (eds) Beyond The Carbon Economy: Energy Law in Transition (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 128-131; Bradbrook, A. J., ‘Sustainable Energy Law: the Past and Future’, (2012) 30 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 511, 517-520.  
23 Bruce, ‘International Law and Renewable Energy’ (n 22), 11-17; Citelli, M., Barassi, M. and Belykh, K, 
‘Renewable Energy in the International Arena: Legal Aspects and Cooperation’ (2014) 2 Groningen Journal of 
International Law, 1, 1-6. 
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In addition to factors retarding investment in renewable energy, its diffusion is hampered by the 
entrenchment of fossil fuels.  Their 80% share in global energy consumption reflects enormous sunk 
investment in infrastructure for energy generation, in the extraction, refining and distribution of 
resources, in the design and manufacture of vehicles consuming fossil fuels, in building stock designed 
for fossil fuel heating, and in general into the more than a century’s worth of learning and knowledge 
and skills acquisition that has fed into creating and maintaining the fossil fuel economy.  Businesses, 
their shareholders and governments have corresponding vested interests in the continued utilisation 
of fossil fuel assets and related revenue streams and tax receipts.  Economies that have become 
dependent on the availability of easily distributable, dense and inexpensive energy baulk at the 
thought of disruption to its supply.  Societal practices such as commuting are based on the easy 
availability and affordability of fossil fuels and of vehicles that consume them whilst attitudes derived 
from accustomisation to the receipt of remotely produced energy without knowledge of its origins 
informs hostility toward renewable energy development in areas that have only been recipients of 
energy produced elsewhere in recent decades.   
All of the above factors contribute to the lock-in of socio-economic systems to fossil fuel energy that 
must be undone to create space for renewable energy development.24  Combinations of measures are 
therefore required that weaken the hold of fossil fuels alongside promoting alternative energy 
sources.  The most immediate means available to states of destabilising the high carbon energy sector 
would be to follow through on commitments already made to withdraw subsidies that are currently 
at four times the level of the much complained of support for renewable energy.25  As discussed 
further in the following section, measures for integrating the environmental costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions into energy prices would also assist with dispelling the perception of renewable energy as 
an expensive alternative and with persuading manufacturers to invest in low carbon alternatives.26  
                                                          
24 Unruh, G. C., ‘Understanding carbon lock-in’, (2000) 28 Energy Policy, 817. 
25 International Energy Agency, ‘World Energy Outlook: Energy Subsidies’, available at 
<http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energysubsidies/> accessed 26 October 2016. 
26 International Renewable Energy Agency, ‘Roadmap’ (n 16), 128-9. 
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Much broader policy and legal intervention is also required at all levels of government to enable 
economic and social transition and adaptation to a post-fossil fuel era.             
The international climate change regime has a major role to play in the destabilisation of high carbon 
fuels by deterring further investment in the fossil fuel sector, and necessitating the early retirement 
of assets dependent on the exploitation of oil, gas and coal if commitments for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions are to be met.  The inclusion of clear normative statements in an agreement on how 
carbon-dependent economies should evolve and corresponding obligations requiring contracting 
parties to give effect to the vision presented can be used to send a signal, whether to energy 
companies or states possessing oil, gas and coal resources, that the international community is 
committed to moving away from high carbon energy with attendant risks that monies invested in fossil 
fuel extraction and consumption may not be recovered.  Whilst there is no guarantee that monies will 
flow to renewable energy under such an approach, the hope is that states will turn to support the 
renewables sector as one of the main means available to them of maintaining energy security and 
supporting economic activity whilst decarbonising energy supplies, and that energy companies will 
alter their investment strategies accordingly.  The stronger the resolve shown by the international 
community to wean itself from its carbon addiction, the more likely it is that renewable energy 
development will be seen as a first option rather than lower carbon fossil fuels (e.g. exchanging coal 
for gas).     
Such statements must receive backing from binding obligations and from credible mechanisms for 
holding parties to account if they are to influence global patterns of energy consumption.  Of particular 
importance are obligations placed on contracting parties to formulate and implement programmes 
for effecting their commitments as it is through the development of supportive policy and legal 
frameworks at national levels that the appeal of renewable energy to investors will best be enhanced.  
The principal role of international law in this regard is to enhance the credibility of the commitments 
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to decarbonise that it requires parties to make by underpinning them with mechanisms for 
international scrutiny and enforcement.  
2.3. Levelling the Playing Field for Energy Sources 
Another means by which international climate change instruments can be used to enhance investor 
confidence in renewable energy is by establishing mechanisms which place a price on greenhouse gas 
emissions at the international level.  This reduces investor perception of renewables as comparatively 
risky by improving their cost competitiveness.  Agreements under which parties take on obligations to 
meet targets for reducing their emissions allow the creation of arrangements under which emissions 
allowances can be traded between parties that need to purchase units to offset emissions exceeding 
their promised reductions and those which have allowances to spare because they have reduced 
emissions below their targets.  Allowances acquire a value representing the scarcity of legally 
permissible emissions that will increase over time as targets for emission reductions become more 
stringent.  From a state’s perspective, such a mechanism operating at the international plane may 
prompt the adoption of policies to stimulate low carbon energy production with a view either to avoid 
rising carbon costs or to benefit from reducing emissions below its committed level by offsetting the 
proceeds of selling allowances against the cost of supporting domestic renewable energy 
development.   
The existence of international commitments to reduce emissions can also provide a stimulus for the 
spread of mechanisms that allow the trade of carbon by private actors.27  Permitting allowances 
acquired from an emissions trading scheme operating in one state to be taken into account when 
calculating whether another state has met its climate change commitments can incentivise states to 
link national trading systems.28  Emissions trading promotes economic efficiency in theory by allowing 
                                                          
27 Jevnaker, T., and Wettestad, J., ‘Linked Carbon Markets: Silver Bullet, or Castle in the Air?’ (2016) 6 Climate 
Law, 142. 
28 Ibid. 
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actors to choose the least cost available option to them of covering their emissions.29  Investment in 
renewable energy will only be stimulated when a scheme creates confidence that carbon prices will 
rise to and remain at a level that make this a lower cost option than acquiring allowances or pursuing 
cheaper technological fixes.30  Emissions trading is not therefore guaranteed to promote renewable 
energy in the short term, but it is hoped that the prospect of rising carbon prices as scheme caps are 
tightened will begin to have this effect as emitters come to appreciate that this will become a cheaper 
option than carbon emitting energy in the not too distant future.31     
The establishment of mechanisms that afford states the flexibility to meet their commitments by 
earning credits from activities leading both to greenhouse gas emission reductions and to sustainable 
development in other states provides a third means by which agreements to reduce emissions under 
international law can be used to drive renewable energy development.  Such approaches can be used 
to attract private investment in renewables by providing an additional revenue stream for projects 
from the sale of credits awarded for avoided emissions at the international level (e.g. selling to states 
that are unable to meet targets for reducing emissions domestically or can do so only at high cost) or 
in national/regional schemes that recognise the credits awarded internationally as valid offsets for 
excess emissions or as acceptable alternatives to domestic reduction by the purchasing actor.  
2.4. Enabling Renewable Energy Development in the Developing World 
The avoidance of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate will involve more than action 
by developed states to decarbonise.  It also requires developing countries that are growing 
economically and the least developed countries that are yet to undergo significant economic growth 
to follow a different developmental pathway based on non-carbon emitting and carbon neutral energy 
sources.  The Convention recognises this by obliging all parties to participate in the global response to 
                                                          
29 Woerdman, E., ‘The EU greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme’ in Woerdman, E., Roggenkamp, M., and 
Holwerda, M., (eds) Essential EU Climate Law (Edward Elgar, 2015), 43, 44-8. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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risks posed by climate change whilst allowing initial license for developing states to increase their 
greenhouse gas emissions in meeting “their social and development needs”.32  However, it failed to 
provide direction on the emissions trajectory that states should follow including when the emissions 
of developing countries should peak.  The need for developing countries to embark on a low carbon 
energy transition or simply to avoid a fossil fuel- based stage in their development is now much greater 
as a result of carbon intensive growth since the early 1990s in some developing states that were in 
the early stages of their development when the Convention was agreed. 
A range of challenges need to be overcome to enable or persuade those countries classed as 
developing to follow a different route to that taken by countries classed as developed under the 
climate change regime during the 19th and 20th centuries.  The more economically advanced 
developing states may have acquired abilities to develop and deploy renewable energy technologies 
themselves, but may be unwilling to do so because it would hand competitive advantages to those 
states that have developed on the back of cheaper and well-established fossil fuel technologies.  They 
may also regard making commitments to replace fossil fuels with renewables as being incompatible 
with the equitable argument that the states primarily responsible for causing the climate crisis in the 
first place should take responsibility for addressing it by cutting their emissions to the extent necessary 
to allow others to have the same opportunities for economic and social development.33  For those 
countries, the provision of financial and technological support by developed state parties as 
compensation (although developed states would not agree to such a description) for their 
consumption of much of the safe climate space may be viewed as a precondition to taking on 
obligations to mitigate climate change.34 
                                                          
32 FCCC (n 7), preamble, 3rd para. 
33 Cullet, P., ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities’ in Fitzmaurice, M., Ong, D., and Merkouris, P., (eds), 
Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, 2010), 169-170. 
34 Ibid. Gaines, S., ‘International Law and Institutions for Climate Change’ in Sarnoff, J., (ed) Research Handbook 
on Intellectual Property and Climate Change (Edward Elgar, 2016), 33, 38-39. 
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Whilst certain developing countries may have some choice over how development is conducted, the 
reality for many of them, and particularly the least developed countries, is that they do not have the 
capacity to initiate low carbon energy development.  States may lack any of the factors required to 
exploit renewable resources including access to relevant technologies, knowledge of how they 
operate and are maintained, awareness of the resources available to them, a capacity to conduct or 
support research on development, the infrastructure required for enabling access to energy for their 
peoples, or the institutions needed to support the growth of a renewables sector including 
appropriate policy and legal frameworks.35  States lacking a supportive policy and legal environment 
for renewable energy development will also struggle to attract investment even where funding is 
available. 
Interstate agreements can play a major part in addressing these challenges by arranging flows of 
finance and technology, both hardware and software, from developed states and their actors 
possessing wealth and knowhow to those in need.36 Obligations to provide financial and technological 
support are also the principal means by which equitable objections to contributing to climate change 
mitigation can be overcome with assistance from developed states amounting to recompense for the 
negative environmental consequences of historic actions as much as a stimulus for the adoption of 
low carbon energy supplies.37  However, the experience with such arrangements under the 
Convention and Protocol, discussed at section 7.1 below, shows that they must be carefully designed 
if they are to realise these potential benefits.  If they are to set states on a low carbon energy pathway 
then parties with established technological capabilities, whether developed or developing, must also 
commit to provide the long-term support required for building capacities in states that lack the 
capabilities required to adopt, adapt, and develop renewable energy technologies domestically.  Risks 
                                                          
35 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Renewable Energy and Climate Change’ (n 14), 195; Ockwell, 
D., and Mallett, A., ‘Introduction: Low-Carbon Technology Transfer – From Rhetoric to Reality’ in Ockwell, D., 
and Mallett, A., (eds) Low-Carbon Technology Transfer – From Rhetoric to Reality (Routledge, 2012), 3, 3-18. 
36 Wilder Am, M., and Drake, L., ‘International Law and the Renewable Energy Sector’ in Carlane, C, Gray, K., 
and Tarasofsky, R., (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 
2016) 358, 359-60.  
37 Gaines, International Law and Institutions’ (n 34), 38-9. 
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arise that support provided to host states lacking indigenous capacities to innovate and without 
contemporaneous efforts to support capacity-building will not have any long-term benefit.38  Provision 
for capacity building under the international climate change regime is considered at section 7.3 below.       
3. Supporting Renewable Energy 
The Convention and the Protocol are largely silent on the potential contribution of renewable sources 
to combating climate change.  The former contains only a general commitment by parties to promote 
and cooperate on the development, application and diffusion of technologies, practices and processes 
that “control, reduce or prevent” greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector among others.39  
The Kyoto Protocol makes only a marginal advance beyond this position, suggesting that parties 
should research, develop, promote and increase the use of new and renewable forms of energy in an 
indicative list of actions that developing country parties should take, but not obliging them to do so.40  
Commentators have criticised this failure to promote perhaps the most effective means available to 
parties of reducing their greenhouse gas emissions in either instrument, and have called for the 
promotion of renewable energy as a main focus of any future instrument with some suggesting that 
a protocol specifically concerned with this would offer a more effective route for greenhouse gas 
reduction than further attempts to reach an international consensus on how responsibility for tackling 
climate change should be allocated.41 
Some consideration was given in the climate change negotiations following the 17th Conference of 
Parties to the Convention at Durban in 2011 to including provisions on options for decarbonising 
energy in a future agreement.  Bruce mentions that renewable energy was contemplated in early 
                                                          
38 Byrne, R., Smith, A., Watson, J., and Ockwell, D., ‘Energy Pathways in Low Carbon Development: the Need to 
Go Beyond Technology Transfer’ in  Ockwell, D., and Mallett, A. (eds) Low Carbon Technology Transfer: From 
Rhetoric to Reality (Routledge, 2012), 123, 124-7;Verbeken, A-M., ‘Low Carbon Technology Transfer under the 
Climate Change Convention: Evolution of Multilateral Technology Support’ in Ockwell, D., and Mallett, A., (eds) 
Low Carbon Technology Transfer: From Rhetoric to Reality (Routledge, 2012), 143, 150-1 and 160.  
39 FCCC (n 7), art 4.1(c). 
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discussions “as an option to increase the ambition of existing pledges and ‘supplementary’ measures 
to reduce emissions before 2020”.42  Citelli refers to the inclusion of provisions making reference to 
renewable energy and energy efficiency in the draft negotiating text annexed to the decision of the 
20th Conference of the Parties to the Convention known as the Lima Call for Climate Action.43  
Paragraph 53 of the section of the text under the heading ‘sources of finance’ includes a proposal for 
the establishment of “an international renewable energy and energy efficiency bond facility”.44  It also 
proposes that parties should employ other measures for levelling the playing field between fossil fuel 
energy and alternative energy sources including a tax on oil exports from developing to developed 
countries and a ‘phasing down’ of high carbon investments and fossil fuel subsidies.45   
It is unsurprising in view of the usual reluctance of states to make commitments that would surrender 
their control over decision-making on the contents of energy supplies that these proposals do not 
survive in the final text of the Agreement.  The only reference of any kind to energy is made in the 
preamble to the decision of the Conference of Parties adopting the Agreement (hereafter ‘the Paris 
Decision’) which acknowledges “the need to promote universal access to sustainable energy in 
developing countries, in particular in Africa, through the enhanced deployment of renewable 
energy”.46  The Paris Decision also contains a statement recognising the important role of providing 
incentives for emission reduction activities including tools such as domestic policies and carbon 
pricing, but lacks any substantive commitment concerning alternative energy forms.47  As a result, the 
Agreement fails to provide any positive stimulus for the growth of renewable energy consumption.  
Its effectiveness for promoting investment in renewables is reliant on its ability to steer energy sector 
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investment and state support for this away from fossil fuels, and to hold contracting parties to 
commitments made to support renewable energy in their NDCs.    
4. Deterring Investment in Fossil Fuel Energy 
Signals sent by the Convention and Protocol have been too weak to alter the behaviours of the fossil 
fuel sector and its supporters.  All states have an obligation to “[f]ormulate, implement, publish and 
regularly update…programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change”, but its effectiveness 
is undermined by the lack of a basis for judging whether or not proposed state actions are sufficient 
to achieve the Convention’s objectives or to discipline contracting parties if they are not.48  The 
principal reason for this is a failure to link the Convention’s goal to avoid dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with state obligations to combat climate change.  The only direction is that developed 
states should aim to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, but no trajectory is proposed for 
reductions beyond this less than exacting staging post.49  Moves to further clarify responsibilities for 
mitigating climate change were initiated by a provision of the Convention itself, reflecting the 
perception of its guidance on mitigation as being inadequate even by those who drafted the 
document.50  Unfortunately, the negotiating model adopted for what became the Kyoto Protocol of 
setting emission targets for specified periods with no mechanism for raising them thereafter apart 
from through further agreement also fails to provide the long term signal required to promote 
disinvestment from fossil fuels.     
The Convention and the Protocol are even less illuminating about the decarbonisation pathway to be 
followed by developing states.  License is provided for them to increase greenhouse gas emissions in 
connection with meeting their “social and development needs”, whilst Article 4(7) advises that the 
extent to which they will effectively implement their commitments “will take fully into account that 
the economic and social development and poverty eradication” are their “first and overriding 
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priorities”.51  Developing countries are not given carte blanche to pursue fossil fuel driven growth 
without constraint.  It would not have made sense for them to take on obligations to mitigate if this 
were the case.  However, no direction is given on the emissions trajectory that they should follow.  
The predictable consequence is that emissions from developing world countries have increased 
dramatically since 1992 with China having become the largest single state emitter in that period.  
Opinions on whether the Agreement signals more strongly the international community’s 
commitment to decarbonisation than its predecessors are hard to reconcile.  Kinley regards it as 
sending a clear message that “the era of fossil fuels is ending” and that “[r]eal transformation of the 
energy sector is the will, and undertaking, of all of the world’s governments, including fossil-fuel 
exporters”.52  In contrast, Spash lambasts an agreement that makes no comment on fossil fuel use.53  
In making this criticism he alludes to the continued lack of provisions providing active support for the 
development of a low carbon energy sector under the international climate change regime.54  If 
considered in isolation, the formal requirements that the Agreement places on parties for reducing 
emissions do not represent a significant advance from the position under the Convention and 
Protocol. The express obligation on developed states to achieve emissions cuts is replaced with a non-
binding statement of expectation that they will do so.  Instead, all states take on a lowest common 
denominator obligation of self-determining their contribution to mitigation efforts.55  Article 4(2) 
echoes the obligation to communicate and implement programmes of measures to mitigate climate 
change under Article 4(1)(b) of the Convention by requiring each party to “prepare, communicate and 
maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve”.  This provision 
could even be said to place a lower level of expectation than the Convention on contracting parties in 
that it requires them only to “pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the 
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objectives of” their NDCs rather than the unqualified requirement under the Convention to implement 
the programmes of measures communicated by them periodically.56 
Where the Agreement does differ from its predecessors is in its clear expectation that parties’ 
contributions will become progressively stronger from the starting point of their initial NDC.  Article 3 
advises that “[t]he efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time”.  Article 4(3) similarly 
advises that each party’s NDC “will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally 
determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition”.  In addition, Article 4(4) advises 
developing country parties that they should “continue enhancing their mitigation efforts”, and that 
they are “encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation 
targets in the light of different national circumstances”.  These provisions make normative statements 
rather than imposing legally binding obligations.  The legal position is therefore no different to that 
under the Convention with parties having no formal obligation to improve their climate change 
responses.  Even so, it is clear that states are expected to strengthen their contributions regularly 
unless justification can be provided for not doing so.      
The sense of commitment by the international community to addressing climate change is further 
reinforced by the Agreement’s direction on the expected contribution of developing country parties 
to achieving its goal of holding the increase in global average temperatures to less than 2°c, and by 
the inclusion for the first time in the international climate change regime of an endpoint for mitigation 
efforts by reference to which the efforts of parties can be assessed. In common with the Convention, 
the Agreement recognises that the emissions of developing country parties are likely to increase 
initially.  Article 4(1) notes that it will take longer for developing countries to reach a point where their 
growth in emissions peaks.  Similarly, they are only encouraged “to move over time towards economy-
wide emission reduction or limitation targets” in contrast to developed states who the Agreement 
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advises should reduce overall emissions as their default approach.57  The Agreement does differ from 
the Convention however in envisaging that developing states will work towards a point where their 
total emissions will start to decline.  It is implicit in the observation that it will take longer for the 
emissions of developing countries to peak that this is something which they should aim for.58  No 
indication is given as to how quickly this should occur, but the unabated growth of developing country 
emissions is unlikely to be compatible with the Agreement’s goal of achieving a balance between 
global emissions by source and removals by sinks during the 21st century even if developed countries 
are able to transition to low carbon economies during the coming decades.59  This goal does not 
envisage a complete withdrawal of greenhouse gas emitting actions which may leave some scope for 
the continued use of fossil fuel energy to the extent that the carbon released can be offset by sinks.  
The very flexible timescale for achieving the goal also detracts somewhat from any sense of urgency 
that the inclusion of a destination may provide.  Even so, the international community has given a 
clear indication that the licence given for developing states to pursue a fossil fuel driven expansion is 
not open-ended.  Its agreed position is that all contracting parties should reduce emissions from their 
energy sectors to levels below what sinks can absorb during this century.   
The intent shown by the Agreement is striking when compared to its predecessors’ lack of vision, but 
its ability to alter investment patterns and to prompt withdrawal of support for fossil fuels is impaired 
by four factors which weaken its message.  First, the Agreement allows states to reflect their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national 
circumstances when preparing their NDCs and determining the extent to which updated submissions 
should improve upon their prior position.60  The possibility remains open therefore for developing 
states to justify lower levels of contribution than what they are capable of on grounds that the lion’s 
share of responsibility for exposing the world to risks of dangerous climate change still lies with 
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developed states because of their historic actions or that developed states have not provided 
sufficient financial and technological support for their mitigation efforts.  It is also conceivable that 
developed states may lower their own ambition if developing states are not thought to be pulling their 
weight.  Parties may come under peer pressure to improve their positions due to the greater 
transparency under the Agreement.61  The wording ‘in the light of different national circumstances’ 
also reinforces the message that parties should reappraise and by implication strengthen their climate 
change mitigation activities in line with economic growth and increasing responsibility in the present 
for consuming what is left of the ‘safe’ climate space.62  Even so, the fact that states are permitted to 
make proposals falling short of what they are capable of by reference to their perception of what 
others should be contributing weakens the impetus provided by requirements for mitigatory efforts 
to be escalated periodically.  
Second, states are not legally bound to enhance their contributions at each five yearly resubmission.  
The extent to which they respond to the Agreement’s several normative expectations depends, in the 
absence of political will to do so voluntarily, on the presence of the following three elements: 
compliance by states with their obligations to provide information under the Agreement’s 
transparency mechanism; the preparedness of other states to impose peer pressure on parties whose 
contributions fall short of what might be expected; and how states subject to this pressure respond.  
A failure to provide the information needed to support this process can also only be rectified by peer 
pressure itself as the Agreement does not establish a mechanism for enforcing compliance by parties 
with their obligations.63  The many variables undermine the confidence that can be drawn from the 
Agreement itself that decarbonisation will proceed inexorably and following a reasonably predictable 
trajectory to the goal of balanced net emissions and temperature increases held below 2°c.  
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A third consideration is that parties are not obliged to implement their NDCs to the letter.  Their 
obligation, as mentioned above, is only to pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of 
achieving the objectives of their NDCs.64   The Agreement implies that NDCs are meant to be taken 
seriously with parties being required to provide information necessary to track progress made by them 
on their implementation, and with this information being made subject to a technical expert review, 
the role of which is to comment and identify areas of improvement in a facilitative non-intrusive non-
punitive manner.65  Again however, the ability of this process to affect the behaviour of states depends 
on their susceptibility to peer pressure with no fall-back position if parties prove immune to external 
opinion.  The likely combined effect of the non-enforceability of NDCs and the absence of an 
enforcement mechanism even for the general obligation that parties do possess to effect 
commitments that they have made independently will be to render the NDC process ineffective for 
altering investor behaviour. 
A fourth weakness lies in the lack of obligation for parties to communicate how the long-term goals 
of the Agreement will be achieved.66  Parties are strongly encouraged to “formulate and communicate 
long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies”, but are not obliged to do so.67  
Instead, the requirement to reconsider national contributions to the global climate change effort 
every five years is likely to introduce short-termism to parties’ thinking informed by the status of 
climate negotiations at that time, by domestic political circumstances, and by individual perception of 
the adequacy of contributions made by others with no guarantee of forwards movement at each stage 
of review.68  Clear statements of pathways towards decarbonisation and of what a decarbonised 
future would look like would assist with redirecting finance away from fossil fuels and towards 
renewable energy if proposed timescales for action are sufficiently exacting to place future cost 
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recovery for investment in the present at risk or if the possibility of a renewables dominated future is 
sufficiently compelling to attract actors looking to benefit from first mover advantage.  In contrast, 
five yearly snapshots may give rise to a ‘wait and see’ attitude amongst investors with a consistent 
practice of emissions cuts amongst the largest state consumers of carbon emitting energy sources 
being required to prompt a change of course.     
In summary, the international community has sent a strong signal in the Agreement that it recognises 
the need to decarbonise, but its ability to influence investment and support for fossil fuel energy is 
impaired by the significant leeway for states to react to or ignore standards which the Agreement 
invites them to observe, and by the lack of legal underpinning for parties’ NDCs.  For all its positive 
noises on tackling the causes of climate change, the Agreement’s main contribution is to create a 
structure for on-going negotiations that may lead to stronger commitments by parties in the future.  
It provides no basis in itself for creating investor confidence that the fossil fuel era will definitely 
conclude within an identifiable timescale, and therefore that financial support should be directed to 
renewables and other low carbon energy sources. 
5. Placing a Price on Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
5.1. Market Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol  
The Protocol allows parties to meet their targets by using allowances purchased through international 
emissions trading to offset emissions exceeding their targets.69  This has not proved to be a significant 
driver for renewable energy as parties’ targets were not exacting enough to create demand for unit 
transfers from other parties.70  Parties with targets under the Protocol are also able to use credits 
earned through project development in other states when calculating whether they have complied 
with their targets.  Joint implementation (JI) permits a party with a target to derive the benefit from 
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emissions reducing projects in another party with a target under the Protocol.71  This mechanism has 
made little contribution to the spread of renewable energy with end of pipe emission reduction 
projects being preferred because credits can be earned at lower expense than through developing 
renewable energy infrastructure.72  The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) enables parties with 
targets to earn credits by undertaking projects in non-target (developing) states that result in long-
term additional emissions reduction over the baseline level that would have pertained without the 
project.73  In contrast to JI, 71% of the 8500 CDM projects as at October 2016 have involved renewable 
energy production.74  This striking difference is due in part to the requirement that projects under the 
CDM should contribute to sustainable development in the host country.75  The mechanisms have seen 
higher levels of use, despite the lack of demand by states for meeting international targets, due to 
allowance for credits to be used as offsets under the EU’s Emissions Trading System.76   
The CDM has been the most obviously successful element of the international climate change regime 
for promoting renewable energy, but there are grounds for arguing that it has not been as effective 
as such a mechanism could have been for driving low carbon energy development in the developing 
world and that the results achieved are unlikely to be long-lasting.  First, some aspects of the 
mechanism detract from the appeal of renewable energy developments compared to alternative 
means of earning credits.  The requirement that emissions savings should be demonstrably additional 
to those that would have occurred on a business as usual basis is harder to demonstrate than for ‘end 
of pipe’ projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions from existing facilities (e.g. capturing methane 
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from landfill sites).77  Such projects are also often more attractive for investors as they can realise very 
large volumes of credits at much lower cost.78  The fact that funding is only available for operational 
projects adds to the appeal of projects presenting a lower risk of loss.79   
Second, the mechanism has proved poor for overcoming barriers to renewable energy in the least 
developed countries of the developing world due to limited capacity for supporting low carbon 
development.  75% of CDM projects are located in China, India, Mexico and Brazil, all of which have 
well-established capacities for technological innovation.80  In contrast, less than 3% of projects are 
located in Africa and less than 1% in the least developed countries due, in large part, to an inability to 
attract and support private investment.81  CDM has also proved to be a weak vehicle for technology 
transfer with the ability of a project to support technological development in the host state not being 
a condition for the issue of credits.82  As the raison d’être for the mechanism is to promote economic 
efficiency by developed states in meeting their targets, it is unsurprising that its participants should 
focus on opportunities for obtaining the maximum credits for the least outlay rather than on 
enhancing capacities for energy innovation in developing states.   
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Third, a stable price at a high enough level for credits is required to attract investment in renewables 
by creating confidence that the high initial development costs will be recouped.  The value of the CDM 
has collapsed, and with it has gone its ability to attract investment in renewables.83  The fact that the 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, already blighted by the lack of emission reduction 
targets for the world’s largest emitters, has not yet entered into force removes international 
demand.84  Requirements for credits from the EU ETS have also declined substantially due initially to 
restrictions of the use of credits from certain gas destroying end of pipe projects because of doubts 
over their credibility and latterly due to a requirement that offsets must derive from projects in least 
developed countries.85 
5.2 Market Mechanisms under the Paris Agreement 
Article 6 of the Agreement identifies two ways in which parties may implement their NDCs through 
voluntary cooperation in addition to their own efforts.  These are: the use of ‘internationally 
determined mitigation outcomes’ derived from cooperation in meeting their NDCs;86 and a 
mechanism, bearing some resemblance to the CDM, allowing all parties to earn emission credits by 
supporting actions to mitigate greenhouse gases and support sustainable development in other 
states.87  In addition, it ‘defines’ a framework for non-market approaches to assisting with the 
implementation of NDCs in “the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication”.88   
The first point to make when considering whether these vehicles for collaboration are likely to be 
more effective for supporting renewable energy development than mechanisms under the Protocol is 
that it is very difficult to determine how any of them will operate from the texts of the Agreement and 
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Decision.89  The details and modalities have been left to bodies operating under the Convention to 
prepare, and it is eminently possible, the inclusion of market mechanisms having been viewed with 
scepticism and opposed by some parties, that agreement on how they should operate will not be 
reached.90  Despite this, some observations can be made about support that the mechanisms may 
provide for overcoming barriers to the diffusion of renewable energy.   
The first is that there is no international emissions trading mechanism of the type established under 
the Protocol as parties do not have legally binding targets under the Agreement.91  However, the 
allowance for all states to include “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs) amongst 
national actions for mitigating climate change in their NDCs preserves the possibility for those 
supporting decarbonisation through renewable energy development to agree on an ad hoc basis with 
states that are less well-placed to decarbonise energy supplies to transfer resulting emission 
reductions to them for a financial consideration.  It could also expand significantly the possibilities 
states have to meet their contributions to climate change mitigation by undertaking emission 
reduction projects in other states.92  In particular, it may incentivise the establishment and linking of 
domestic emission trading schemes if allowances to emit issued under them and transferred between 
them are accepted as ITMOs for the purposes of preparing and implementing NDCs.93  The expansion 
of mechanisms that place a price on carbon could assist with levelling the playing field for renewable 
energy globally, but only, as noted above, if it results in the prospect of high enough carbon costs to 
incentivise investment in renewables by making them a financially preferable alternative.  The spread 
of emissions trading would not be beneficial for the renewable energy sector if a rush to link with 
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schemes offering lower cost opportunities for covering emissions were to depress the carbon price.  
It may also be to the detriment of the renewables sector if subsidies, although they are frequently 
essential for early stage commercialisation and to support more expensive renewable technologies, 
are removed to prevent support external to the trading system from impairing its economic efficiency 
by giving rise to unused units for reasons other than that investing in renewable energy is the most 
economically rational way to proceed.  
Second, the fact that the Sustainable Development mechanism was proposed by Brazil as an improved 
version of the CDM (describing it as CDM+) suggests that it will be expected to provide a vehicle for 
trading units representing avoided emissions, and, in doing so, for leveraging private investment in 
relevant projects.94  Direction in the Agreement that the mechanism should “incentivize and facilitate 
participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities…” and in the 
Paris Decision that the mechanism should build on “[e]xperience gained with and lessons learned from 
existing mechanisms and approaches adopted under the Convention and its related legal instruments” 
reinforces this impression.95  Accordingly, it appears that arrangements of the type that proved 
successful for involving private actors with renewable energy projects under the Protocol will be 
continued, although much further detailing of how the mechanism will operate is required to confirm 
this.96  For example, a new means of allocating credits for emission reductions will need to be 
developed in the absence of set targets that can more easily be subdivided into allowances.     
Third, the basis for operation of the Sustainable Development mechanism set out in the Paris Decision 
requires that proposals for activities should be able to demonstrate the ‘additionality’ of emissions 
savings that they are expected to realise over a business as usual scenario.97 It proved harder for new 
build renewable energy projects to satisfy a similar requirement under the CDM (e.g. that the project 
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displaces carbon-emitting energy development) than for projects involving emissions reductions from 
existing plant.98  Further conditions are included in the Agreement that the mechanism should both 
“contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party” and “deliver an overall mitigation in 
global emissions”.99  It is not clear what is meant by the latter condition, but the impression is that the 
use of credits to offset emissions exceeding a party’s commitment will be frowned on.100  This would 
be beneficial for emissions reductions, but may also lead to continued favouring of ‘end of pipe’ 
projects for which it is easier to demonstrate that overall emission reductions have been achieved.  
Both conditions would also limit the extent to which the mechanism is capable of driving renewable 
energy development and related technology transfer in the least developed countries as they have 
fewer emissions to reduce than other states.   
Fourth, the scope of activities that would be regarded as ITMOs and that would fall under the 
sustainable development mechanism requires further definition,101 but arguably encompasses not 
only the individual projects supported by the JI and CDM mechanisms, but also the implementation 
of policies, plans and programmes.102  A broad understanding of supported activities could allow very 
large numbers of credits to be earned from sector-wide interventions.  The allowance for all parties 
to transfer ITMOs and to undertake activities under the Sustainable Development mechanism also 
expands possibilities for states to support renewable energy development in other states including for 
technologically literate developing country parties such as China and India to benefit from supporting 
poorer developing countries.103     
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Finally, it is not clear what purpose the non-market approaches are intended to serve.104  It is implicit 
from references to sustainable development, poverty eradication, finance, technology transfer and 
capacity-building that they are meant to facilitate the performance of developed state obligations to 
support mitigation and adaptation efforts.  This could be beneficial if it assists with addressing 
problems discussed in section 7 below.  However, the proposed institutional development has the 
appearance of something agreed to smooth ruffled feathers in negotiations (in this case those of 
Bolivia and other developing states that opposed the inclusion of market mechanisms in the 
Agreement) rather than because it would clearly enhance global mitigation efforts.  The perennial risk 
with responding to difficulties by adding institutional layers, as seen with climate finance, is that the 
resulting complexity will make it harder rather than easier to achieve the objectives that the new 
institution is intended to promote.  
In summary, it can be surmised from the rough outlines of cooperation mechanisms in Article 6 of the 
Agreement that they may, depending on how they are fleshed out by the Conference of Parties to the 
Paris Agreement, maintain and build on incentives provided under the Protocol that enjoyed some  
success with supporting renewable energy development.  It can also be noted in advance of further 
details of the outlined mechanisms being provided that they potentially expand the range of 
renewable-energy related projects from which benefits may be derived through cooperation, but that 
they also fail to remedy some weaknesses of the CDM and JI for supporting renewables (e.g. 
additionality), and may also add to them by requiring that activities should reduce existing emissions 
in the host state and contribute to an overall global mitigation to be eligible under the sustainable 
development mechanism.  In addition, it should be borne in mind that the success of the CDM for 
supporting renewables was largely due, as noted in section 6.1 above, to demand for units under the 
EU emissions trading system.  This will not be replicated unless emissions trading schemes in the EU 
and elsewhere allow international units to be used under them as offsets or alternatives to domestic 
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emission reduction.  There is no guarantee without this demand that the price of credits under the 
sustainable development mechanism (and in connection with ITMOs if a market is established for 
them as some pro-emissions trading actors have called for)105 will be sufficient to attract investment 
in renewable energy projects.  In this regard, intended nationally determined contributions submitted 
before the Paris Conference of Parties showed limited appetite for purchasing units from other 
parties.106               
6. Supporting Renewable Energy Production in the Developing World 
6.1. Climate Finance and Technology Transfer under the Convention 
Several difficulties have been experienced with realising the potential of arrangements for climate 
finance and technology transfer under the Convention and Protocol to enable low carbon energy 
development and the growth of renewable energy as part of this in the developing world.  First, what 
developed states are required to do to comply with their obligations is unclear from the vague wording 
of the relevant provisions of the Convention and Protocol.107  The expenditure covered by the 
obligation to meet the “agreed full incremental costs” of measures by developing states to implement 
their obligations under the Convention is not defined.108  The amount of support to be provided and 
how the burden for financing this should be shared amongst developed states are not specified.  The 
parties made a belated attempt to clarify the position at the Copenhagen Conference of Parties in 
2009 by agreeing that developed states should mobilise $100 billion funding annually by 2020, but 
this agreement is also difficult to effect due to a lack of guidance on how responsibility for raising this 
amount should be allocated.109  Implementing the Convention’s technology transfer provision has 
similarly been made difficult by uncertainty over what actions the obligation to “promote, facilitate 
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and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and 
know-how to other Parties” requires developed states to undertake,110 and by failures to define clearly 
what technology transfer involves or to specify the financial support that should be provided for 
this.111 
Second, workable procedures for disbursing funds and for transferring technological knowhow have 
been slow to develop.112  The World Bank’s Global Environment Facility was chosen as the vehicle for 
distributing financial support, but its practice of granting support on a discretionary basis has angered 
developing states who view the provision of financial backing for their mitigation efforts in line with 
developed state obligations under the Convention as an entitlement.113  The creation of several 
funding channels to deal with specific situations and to create alternative providers to the Global 
Environment Facility have led to what has been described as “a spaghetti bowl” of funding 
mechanisms whose relationships and relative roles have not been defined.114  This has resulted in high 
transaction costs for developing country parties and compounds problems caused by poor definition 
of developed country responsibilities by making it difficult to track financing or to hold parties to 
account for non-compliance.115  As for technology transfer, it is only recently that a serious attempt 
has been made to determine how technological support can be delivered through the establishment 
at the Cancun Conference of Parties in 2010 of a Technology Mechanism.116     
Third, insufficient transparency concerning finance and technology have made it difficult throughout 
the operation of the international climate change regime to establish how much support has been 
provided, whether claimed support satisfies obligations of developed states with related concerns 
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that monies provided for different purposes have been relabelled as climate finance, and whether the 
funding and technological assistance that has been transferred to developing countries has had any 
positive effect.117   A lack of clarity creates fertile ground for parties to argue about whether or not 
sufficient support has been provided rather than concentrating on enabling renewable energy 
development.  In the same vein, the fact that developing states are not obliged to identify assistance 
required by them or to account for what they have received has allowed scope for them to complain 
that support has been inadequate without being clear about what backing they require for the 
creation of a renewable energy capacity.118     
Fourth, expectations under the Convention and Protocol of transfers purely from a developed North 
to an undeveloped South do not correspond with changed economic realities.119  Brazil, India and 
China have become economic powers in their own right and have burgeoning capacities for 
technological innovation, but are under no obligation to afford financial and technological support to 
others.  Any assistance that they do offer passes under the radar as developing country parties are not 
required to report on this. 
The many uncertainties mentioned above have allowed the serious business of establishing low 
carbon economies in the developing world to become mired in debate and recrimination.  Developing 
states argue that funding provided has been inadequate whilst developed states attribute problems 
not to failings on their part but to a lack of the enabling environments required for recipients of 
support to benefit from it including by attracting private investment.120  The perception of inadequate 
support has been used by developing countries to oppose calls made on them in climate negotiations 
to take a more active role in mitigating climate change.121  The resulting effect on the diffusion of 
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renewable energy technologies has been two-fold: more limited progress with the spread of 
renewable energy in the developing world than might otherwise have been achieved through 
developed world support; and a broader weakening of the impetus provided by the international 
climate change regime for decarbonising energy supplies due to the disengagement of states 
responsible for an increasing proportion of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions and with growing 
capacities for technological innovation from the global effort to mitigate climate change. 
6.2. Climate Finance and Technology Transfer under the Paris Agreement 
Negotiations leading to the Agreement afforded an opportunity to improve the effectiveness of 
climate finance and technology transfer under the international climate change regime by clarifying 
developed country obligations, improving processes for transferring and applying funds, and 
increasing transparency over the provision and employment of support.  Unfortunately, these nettles 
have not been grasped fully.  The obligation for developed states to provide financial support is no 
better defined than corresponding provisions under the Convention and Protocol with the developing 
country call for the expected annual contribution to be stated in the Agreement having met strong 
opposition.122  The $100 billion mobilisation by 2020 goal is repeated in the non-binding Paris Decision, 
but does not add detail to the promise made under the Copenhagen Accord or offer guidance on how 
the responsibility for providing this level of finance or the higher amount which the decision advises 
should be mobilised from 2025 should be shared amongst contributing states.123  Indeed, the relevant 
paragraph of the decision leaves it unclear whether the post-2025 burden will fall on developed states 
alone or will be spread more widely amongst states possessing the capacity to support others.  
The provision on technology transfer is enhanced marginally by a very high level vision of what this 
process is intended to achieve, but still lacks the detail required to pin developed states down to 
specific commitments or to judge the adequacy of the support provided by them.124  The institutional 
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arrangements introduced at Cancun are endorsed and embellished by the establishment of a 
Technology Framework, the purpose of which is to provide overarching guidance to the Technology 
Mechanism’s work.125  It appears from the description of the Technology Framework in the Paris 
Decision that its role will be to address some of the weaknesses mentioned in Section 7.1 above with 
the existing arrangements under the Convention.126  It is expected to facilitate not only the 
identification of developing states’ technology needs to enable a more focused approach to 
technology transfer, but also the “enhanced implementation of their results…through the preparation 
of bankable projects”.127  Importantly, its role also includes “the enhancement of enabling 
environments for and the addressing of barriers to the development and transfer of socially and 
environmentally sound technologies”.128  While the Technology Framework may be a valuable 
addition if it strengthens support for renewable energy development in these respects, it is not clear 
why an overarching body to give policy guidance on technology transfer is necessary when the existing 
Technology Executive Committee wing of the Mechanism already has a policy role. 129 The creation of 
an additional institution raises concerns that the administrative complexity seen with arrangements 
for climate finance is being repeated, potentially adding a new problem of uncertainty over relative 
responsibilities between the various bodies to existing difficulties with technology transfer under the 
climate change regime.    
The Agreement strengthens developed country obligations for reporting on climate finance and 
technology transfer.  It does this by incorporating transparency arrangements adopted by the Cancun 
Conference of Parties within the body of the Agreement.130  Developed states are required to report 
qualitatively and quantitatively every two years on finance provided and mobilised by them.131  They 
must also provide information on support provided to developing states for technology transfer and 
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capacity building.132  This information will be made subject to a Technical Expert Review.133  Efforts 
made to comply with financing responsibilities will also be examined by all parties “in a facilitative, 
multilateral consideration of progress”.134  It is made clear that neither review is intended to be 
intrusive or punitive, but examination of their contributions, combined with the fuller information 
now required, will make it harder for developed states to conceal inadequate levels of support.  The 
proposed review in a five yearly global stocktake of whether collective finance is compatible with the 
Agreement’s goal of finance flows that are “consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas 
emissions” will not comment on each party’s efforts, but further magnifies the focus on the individual 
contribution of states through the requirement that its results should inform their subsequent 
updating and enhancing of nationally determined actions and support.135 
Unfortunately, the potential for enhanced transparency on developed country actions to dispel 
uncertainty is undermined by a continued lack of obligation for developing states either to provide 
information on support made available to or received by them or on their needs for assistance.136  
They are only encouraged to report on these matters or advised that they “should” do so.137  The fact 
that the Agreement expects transparency will make it harder for developing states to argue credibly 
that the assistance from developed states is inadequate whilst refusing to disclose what they have 
received and how the support has been employed.  Even so, the failure to make reporting on all 
aspects of the financial and technological transfers mandatory leaves much scope for continued 
argument over the adequacy of developed state support of the type that have blighted climate change 
negotiations in recent years. 
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With regard to the flow of support, the Agreement is notable for encouraging developing state parties 
to provide climate finance.138  It is also implicit in the failure to place the obligation to provide support 
for the implementation of the technology transfer provision on developed country parties alone that 
developing country parties with a capacity to provide technological support may be expected to do 
so.139  Similarly, the description of the new minimum level of climate finance to be agreed before 2025 
as ‘collective’ implies that the better off developing country parties as well as developed states may 
come under pressure to contribute to this.140  Inclusion of developing state parties within the frame 
of possible contributors to climate finance and technology transfer represents a significant departure 
from the bifurcated world of the Kyoto Protocol, but falls short of the express broadening of the donor 
pool that developed state parties called for in negotiations leading to the Agreement as recognition 
of changed economic circumstances since the early 1990s.141    
Finally, the Agreement makes no reference to the effect of intellectual property rights on technology 
transfer.  Developing country views that the existence of such rights obstruct the transfer of 
technological knowhow and developed country arguments that other factors, particularly the lack of 
supportive policy and legal frameworks for technology investment and innovation, are to blame have 
become proxies for wider discontents over the functioning of the climate finance and technology 
transfer provisions.142  The fact that claimed difficulties with transferring technology posed by 
intellectual property rights are not addressed may reflect tacit recognition that this is not in actuality 
the major problem it is sometimes presented as, but silence on this issue, as with developing country 
reporting, leaves continued space for it to be raised as a barrier to low carbon development in future 
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negotiations on whether and to what extent developing country parties should take on fuller 
responsibility for mitigating climate change.143 
In summary, the Agreement makes some minor contributions to rectifying problems with climate 
finance and technology transfer under the Convention by strengthening reporting requirements for 
developed states and creating new institutions (e.g. the Technology Framework) that have the 
potential to address present weaknesses.  Little improvement has been made in most respects 
however with no further clarification on matters central to the provision of support including the 
responsibility borne by individual parties and the relationships between and roles of the several 
institutions responsible for distributing support, and with developing countries having no obligation 
to provide vital information for the effective functioning of financial and technology transfer 
provisions.  These and other residual difficulties identified in this section are likely to impede the 
spread of renewable energy in the developing world under the climate change regime, and raise the 
risk that on-going debate over the adequacy of support will continue to be used both by developed 
and developing states as grounds for refusing to take on stricter obligations to decarbonise with 
consequences for the rate of fossil fuel displacement by renewables globally.    
6.3. Capacity Building 
The preceding sections identify problems with mechanisms for climate finance and technology 
transfer that have limited their support for renewable energy development.  To the extent that 
support has been provided, its effectiveness is further impaired where confidence is lacking in the 
ability of states to provide a stable investment destination due to the absence of appropriate policy 
and legal frameworks and of coherent regulatory frameworks for renewable energy.  Private investors 
may be unwilling to finance projects in such circumstances even when official development aid is 
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available from the climate change regime’s funding bodies.144  States may also be unable to take 
advantage of projects involving the transfer of renewable energy hardware to them where they lack 
the innovation capacity required to adopt and adapt the technology provided to them.145  Without 
this, any investments that are made may not enable the host state to achieve long-term sustainability 
in its energy supplies.  The key response to this situation is for states with established capacities for 
technological innovation to provide developing countries with the long-term support required to 
cultivate their own capabilities for supporting renewable energy in policy law and for adopting, 
adapting, manufacturing and deploying technologies made available to them.   
Capacity building has been a feature of the climate change regime from its inception.146  Article 4(5) 
of the Convention obliges developed country parties to “support the development and enhancement 
of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties” in connection with the 
provision of technological support.  However, as with technology transfer itself the parties have been 
slow to transfer general commitments into detailed programmes for action.  A framework for capacity 
building was established in 2001 by a decision of the Marrakesh conference of parties to the 
Convention,147 but the workstream has continued to hold a lower profile than other areas of interstate 
action under the international regime despite periodic reappraisal of how its status could be 
enhanced.148  
With this unpromising backdrop in mind, the inclusion of a standalone provision for capacity building 
in the Paris Agreement may be its most valuable contribution to improving support for renewable 
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energy development in the developing world.149  The article itself mostly consists of statements 
recording a consensus on the desirability of support for capacity building to enable climate change 
mitigation and adaptation action by developing states including by acquiring abilities to facilitate 
technology development, dissemination and deployment and to access climate finance.  Of more 
significance is the establishment of the Paris Committee on Capacity Building, a new meta-institution 
with a broad remit to address gaps in and enhance existing efforts in this area in all aspects of the 
climate change regime for which such support is required.150 The Committee’s terms of reference and 
its work programme will be developed in subsequent conferences of parties to the Convention and 
Agreement,151 but the fact that this essential area for low carbon energy development has been 
recognised and strengthened in the Agreement is a step in the right direction for setting developing 
states on a low carbon energy pathway.      
7. Conclusion 
Looked at in isolation, the Agreement does not inspire confidence that it will provide the engine house 
for an international diffusion of renewable energy.  It does not directly promote renewables.  It 
encourages but does not ensure that states will progressively increase their climate change mitigation 
efforts including by pursuing low carbon energy development.  It leaves plenty of scope for argument 
both over how the burden of responding to climate change should be shared amongst contracting 
parties and on whether the developed world has atoned for its sins sufficiently by providing financial, 
technological and capacity building support to derail whatever motive force the Agreement may 
provide for displacing fossil fuel energy by renewable alternatives.   Longstanding problems with 
arrangements for climate finance and technology transfer, the international climate change regime’s 
main channels for supporting low carbon energy development and innovation in the developing world, 
have only partially been addressed.  Finally, even where states do make strong commitments to 
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support renewable energy in their NDCs, they cannot be forced to stand by them.    However, it does 
at least create a framework for on-going negotiations that may lead to a progressive strengthening of 
international support for renewables including by allowing public and private actors that have 
promoted the replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energy to place pressure on contracting 
parties that prove more reticent to alter their energy-consuming behaviours.     
It is clear from the announcement of several major initiatives for advancing renewable energy 
production globally at the Paris Conference of Parties and from the inclusion of measures to promote 
renewables in the great majority of parties’ Intended Nationally Determined Contributions submitted 
before the Paris Conference of Parties that it is viewed as one of the principal means by which the 
Agreement’s goals can be achieved.152  20 leading economies (including China, India, Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile and Saudi Arabia, all classed as ‘developing’ states under the climate change regime) established 
Mission Innovation under which they commit to enhance significantly their policies and legal 
frameworks for energy innovation with a view to achieving reductions in the cost of energy production 
that will enable renewable energy technologies to displace fossil fuels as the cheaper option.153  
Mission Innovation is complemented by the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, a parallel initiative 
established by 28 of the world’s wealthiest individuals and entrepreneurs (including Bill Gates, Mark 
Zuckerberg and Jeff Bezos) whose aim is to scale up the public research pipeline by linking it to 
“patient, flexible investment committed to developing the technologies that will create a new energy 
mix”.154  Equivalent statements of intent from developing state groups are seen in the establishment 
of: the International Solar Alliance, a group helmed by India and France with the backing of 120 states 
which seeks to establish conducive conditions and mobilise financial support for exploiting the vast 
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solar power potential of the ‘sunny south’ lying between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn;155 and 
the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, an organisation operating under the African Union whose 
purpose is to assist states on the African continent with addressing barriers to renewable energy 
development including through capacity building and mobilising finance in order to realise 300GW 
new and additional generating capacity from renewables by 2030.156   
If the majority of states involved with these actions do not follow through on their commitments then 
there is little that can be done to bring them to account under the Agreement.  Its dependence on the 
prospect of being named and shamed will hold little fear for contracting parties if the largest 
greenhouse gas emitters collectively fail to act.  However, if they do show the political will to combat 
climate change by switching to renewable energy then the Agreement provides an environment within 
which laggards will come under increasing pressure to follow suit.  It is through the actions of 
contracting parties rather than by statements endorsed by them as members of the international 
community or made by them in their NDCs that the effectiveness of the Agreement’s ‘voluntary 
pledging, plus peer pressure’157 approach will ultimately be judged.                                          
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